Genetic traits and causal explanation

In Kathryn Plaisance & Thomas Reydon (eds.), Philosophy of Behavioral Biology. Springer. pp. 65-82 (2012)
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Abstract
I use a contrastive theory of causal explanation to analyze the notion of a genetic trait. The resulting definition is relational, an implication of which is that no trait is genetic always and everywhere. Rather, every trait may be either genetic or non-genetic, depending on explanatory context. I also outline some other advantages of connecting the debate to the wider causation literature, including how that yields us an account of the distinction between genetic traits and genetic dispositions.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
Causation, Prediction, and Search.Spirtes, Peter; Glymour, Clark & Scheines, Richard
Making Things Happen.Hiddleston, E.
The Scientific Image.Friedman, Michael

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