What anti-individualists cannot know a priori

Analysis 59 (1):48-51 (1999)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Note first that knowledge of one's own thought-contents would not count as a priori according to the usual criteria for knowledge of this kind. Surely, then, incompatibilists are using this term to refer to some other, stipulatively defined, epistemic property. But could this be, as suggested by McKinsey { 1 99 1: 9), the property of being knowable 'just by thinking' or 'from the armchair'? Certainly not if these were metaphors for knowledge attainable on the basis of reason alone, since self-knowledge would fail to come out a priori in this sense. And exactly the same would happen if the property were that of being knowable by inference, since, according to a common intuition, self-knowledge is noninferential
PhilPapers/Archive ID
NUCWAC-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
772 ( #4,878 of 53,519 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #21,616 of 53,519 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.