Standing to Blame and Standing to Praise?

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Praise and blame are both forms of moral assessment. Yet, the literature on standing has focussed on blame – to blame appropriately one needs standing to do so. Praise has been mostly ignored. This paper argues that the asymmetrical treatment of praise and blame is unwarranted: there’s no good reason to think that we need standing to blame, but don’t need standing to praise. This conclusion is important because it provides a new line of argument for scepticism about standing to blame.

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Maggie O’Brien
York University

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