Evidence of Falsehood

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It has been largely assumed from the start that truth, the first premise of the Tripartite theory of Knowledge, is necessary for a mental state of knowing. And this has intuitively made sense. Examples that demonstrate the logic of this premise are wide-spread and easily found. Yet, if one tries to establish the necessity of this condition for oneself, one may discover, a logical flaw in this premise. In theory truth is necessary, however, in practice it is not truth that establishes knowledge. -/- We obtain knowledge using our perception or five senses. We accept the subjectivity of perspective, even though truth may or may not be established. We reject knowledge only when evidence of falsehood is obtained, if ever. -/- In practice, in the obtaining of knowledge of the conditional, those things we experience that could have been otherwise, truth is not established. The fundamental application of how we attain knowledge is in witnessing with our perception, our five senses, evidence for our conclusion. However, evidence provides support for our conclusion, by way of justification, but does not by itself provide truth. And therefore, it is not truth that is necessary for knowledge. It is the lack of evidence of falsehood in our conclusion that is the basis of our knowledge. And a lack of evidence of falsehood, is not the equal of truth. -/- The following thought experiment will demonstrate this flaw between theory and practice.
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Archival date: 2016-03-01
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