Singer’s Notion of Speciesism: A Case for Animal Rights in Ejagham Culture

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Abstract
This work is an examination of Peter Singer’s notion of speciesism: case for animal rights in Ejagham culture. It primarily deals with an evaluation of the phenomenon of animal rights from the standpoint of Peter Singer’s notion of speciesism. Singer’s notion of speciesism deals with the moral obligation humans owe to animals as against the bias or prejudice that humanity has greater moral worth than non-human animals. Most opponents of speciesism contend that, animals are not members of the moral community as such humans have no moral obligation to them. Contrary to this view, proponents of speciesism argue that animals are capable of suffering and should be considered morally. Thus, the emphasis here is that just like many societies of the world, the Ejagham people are guilty of speciesism. Among the several ways by which speciesism is practiced, this work identifies hunting, deforestation, bush burning and fishing as ways by which the Ejagham people are guilty. Using the tool of critical analysis, evaluation and prescription, this work submits that animals have interest, as such, should be granted rights.
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Archival date: 2019-08-23
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