Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):319-333 (2020)
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Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...
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Archival date: 2019-04-08
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