Imagination, Thought Experiments, and Personal Identity

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (67):69-88 (2023)
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Abstract

Should we descry the nature of the self from thought experiments? Shaun Nichols says ‘maybe,’ but only if we use thought experiments that do not recruit the indexical “I” (non-I-recruiting). His reason is that the psychology of “I” perforce mandates that imagination responds to thought experiments that recruit it (I-recruiting) peculiarly. Here, I consider whether he is correct about non-I-recruiting personal identity thought experiments. I argue positively using the same framework, i.e., considering the underlying psychology.

Author's Profile

Michael Omoge
University of Alberta

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