Naturalised Modal Epistemology and Quasi-Realism

South African Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):229-241 (2021)
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Abstract
Given quasi-realism, the claim is that any attempt to naturalise modal epistemology would leave out absolute necessity. The reason, according to Simon Blackburn, is that we cannot offer an empirical psychological explanation for why we take any truth to be absolutely necessary, lest we lose any right to regard it as absolutely necessary. In this paper, I argue that not only can we offer such an explanation, but also that the explanation won’t come with a forfeiture of the involved necessity. Using ‘squaring the circle’ as evidence, I show that, contrary to quasi-realism, absolute necessity won’t be left out in attempts to naturalise modal epistemology.
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First archival date: 2021-05-17
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