Abstract

Despite the various criteria presented in the literature, most authors engaged in the debate about emergence agree on a fundamental distinction between strong/ontologically robust cases of emergence and weak/metaphysically innocent ones. The former typically involve entities that exhibit new causal capacities, while the latter are primarily associated with deductive unpredictability, conceptual novelty, and other qualities that highlight our epistemic limitations in understanding them. In this paper, I initially examine a paradigmatic example of weak emergence, namely the higher-level patterns generated by virtual Cellular Automata (CAs) as analysed by Mark Bedau. Then, I demonstrate that the same mechanism can be observed in real biological systems, such as the dynamics governing the pigmentation ontogeny of the ocellated lizard (Timon lepidus). Unlike virtual CAs, however, real CAs produce patterns that seem to perform non-reducible functions. Therefore, I propose that despite the similarities between virtual and real CAs, the pigmentation pattern of the ocellated lizard should be regarded as a case of strong emergence. Moreover, I suggest that this analysis may shed light on the nature of biological emergent entities in general. Finally, the paper includes an Addendum introducing an issue that, while not exhaustively addressed here, is highly relevant: how to metaphysically conceptualise the causal efficacy exhibited by the pigmentation patterns.