Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports

Mind and Language 33 (4):415-437 (2018)
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Abstract

It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject’s possession of a singular thought, then ‘acquaintance’-style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on poorly motivated claims about how we talk about the attitudes. I offer a framework for propositional attitude reports which provides both attractive solutions to recalcitrant puzzle cases and the key to preserving acquaintance constraints. The upshot is that there is an independently motivated response to the principal argument against acquaintance.

Author's Profile

James Openshaw
Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes

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