Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports

Mind and Language 33 (4):415-437 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject’s possession of a singular thought, then ‘acquaintance’-style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on poorly motivated claims about how we talk about the attitudes. I offer a framework for propositional attitude reports which provides both attractive solutions to recalcitrant puzzle cases and the key to preserving acquaintance constraints. The upshot is that there is an independently motivated response to the principal argument against acquaintance.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
OPESTA
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-05-29
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
The Reference Book.Hawthorne, John & Manley, David
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David
The Varieties of Reference.Antony, Louise M.; Evans, Gareth & McDowell, John
Brainstorms.Dennett, Daniel C.

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-04-10

Total views
151 ( #18,604 of 40,016 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
65 ( #7,254 of 40,016 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.