Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports

Mind and Language 33 (4):415-437 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject’s possession of a singular thought, then ‘acquaintance’-style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on poorly motivated claims about how we talk about the attitudes. I offer a framework for propositional attitude reports which provides both attractive solutions to recalcitrant puzzle cases and the key to preserving acquaintance constraints. The upshot is that there is an independently motivated response to the principal argument against acquaintance.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
OPESTA
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-05-29
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-04-10

Total views
362 ( #15,639 of 58,396 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #14,640 of 58,396 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.