Rowe's evidential arguments from evil

In Justin P. McBrayer & Daniel Howard‐Snyder (eds.), A Companion to the Problem of Evil. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 49-66 (2013)
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This chapter discusses the two most prominent recent evidential arguments from evil, due, respectively, to William Rowe and Paul Draper. I argue that neither of these evidential arguments from evil is successful, i.e. such that it ought to persuade anyone who believes in God to give up that belief. In my view, theists can rationally maintain that each of these evidential arguments from evil contains at least one false premise.

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Graham Oppy
Monash University


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