Locke's Exclusion Argument

History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2):181-196 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that Locke is not in fact agnostic about the ultimate nature of the mind. In particular, he produces an argument, much like Jaegwon Kim's exclusion argument, to show that any materialist view that takes mental states to supervene on physical states is committed to epiphenomenalism. This result helps illuminate Locke's otherwise puzzling notion of 'superaddition.'
PhilPapers/Archive ID
OTTLEA
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-02-08

Total views
419 ( #15,218 of 2,448,660 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #43,077 of 2,448,660 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.