Locke's Exclusion Argument

History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2):181-196 (2010)
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In this paper, I argue that Locke is not in fact agnostic about the ultimate nature of the mind. In particular, he produces an argument, much like Jaegwon Kim's exclusion argument, to show that any materialist view that takes mental states to supervene on physical states is committed to epiphenomenalism. This result helps illuminate Locke's otherwise puzzling notion of 'superaddition.'

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Walter Ott
University of Virginia


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