Expert Deference about the Epistemic and Its Metaepistemological Significance

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):524-538 (2020)
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This paper focuses on the phenomenon of forming one’s judgement about epistemic matters, such as whether one has some reason not to believe false propositions, on the basis of the opinion of somebody one takes to be an expert about them. The paper pursues three aims. First, it argues that some cases of expert deference about epistemic matters are suspicious. Secondly, it provides an explanation of such a suspiciousness. Thirdly, it draws the metaepistemological implications of the proposed explanation.
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Archival date: 2020-01-09
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