Higher-Order Evidence and the Duty To Double-Check

Noûs (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The paper proposes an account of the rational response to higher-order evidence whose key claim is that whenever we acquire such evidence we ought to engage in the inquiring activity of double-checking. Combined with a principle that establishes a connection between rational inquiry and rational belief retention, the account offers a novel explanation of the alleged impermissibility of retaining one’s belief in the face of higher-order evidence. It is argued that this explanation is superior to the main competitor view which appeals to the notion of defeat.

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Michele Palmira
Complutense University of Madrid

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