Why Truth-Relativists Should Be Non-conformists

Acta Analytica 30 (3):239-247 (2015)
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In recent work, J. Adam Carter argues that truth-relativism should be compatible with the so-called conformist response to peer disagreement about taste to the effect that subjects should revise their opinions. However, Carter claims that truth-relativism cannot make sense of this response since it cannot make sense of the idea that when two subjects are recognised as epistemic peers, they should acknowledge that they are equally likely to be right about the targeted issue. The main aim of this paper is a modest one: to argue that truth-relativists should not be worried about their alleged incompatibility with conformism for they should be non-conformists
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