Against the Besire Theory of Moral Judgment

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper critically examines two objections and raises a new objection against the besire theory of moral judgment. Firstly, Smith (1994) observes that a belief that p tends to expire whereas a desire that p tends to endure on the perception that not p. His observation does not refute the sophisticated version of the besire theory that to besire that p is to believe that p and to desire to act in accordance with the belief that p. Secondly, Zangwill (2008) claims that the strength of motivation may vary while the degree of belief remains constant. Besirists would reply that a besire admits of both degree and strength. Finally, I argue that the belief that p endures while the desire to act on the belief that p expires with the introduction of a new bodily condition, and hence that the belief and the desire are distinct mental states.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2017-03-26)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
188 ( #24,011 of 52,728 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #28,011 of 52,728 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.