Contenido conceptual - contenido no conceptual: una distinción de tipo

Escritos 49 (22):369-397 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract The distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual contents clearly has consequences for the configuration of the world of humans as well as for the possibility of attributing thought, in the strict sense, to systems and nonhuman organisms. With the aim of clarifying such a distinction, the following paper poses a basic notion of mental state and, especially, a clear definition of concept, along with the fundamental features of the states in which concepts occur. The conclusion of the paper is that we have good and enough reasons to speak of conceptual and nonconceptual contents instead of more-or-less conceptual concepts. It means that there is a distinction of kind, not of degree, between both contents.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-02-24
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
35 ( #53,981 of 58,296 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #57,007 of 58,296 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.