Entension, or How it could happen that an object is wholly located in each of many places.

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Normally this is not how we think material objects work. I, for example, am a material object that is located in multiple places: this place to my left where my left arm is, and this, distinct, place to my right, where my right arm is. But I am only partially located in each place. My left arm is a part of me that fills exactly the place to my left, and my right arm is a distinct part of me that fills exactly the place to my right. I am located in multiple places by virtue of having distinct parts in those places. So entension is not happening to me — I do not entend.
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Archival date: 2018-08-07
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References found in this work BETA
Four Dimensionalism.Sider, Theodore
.van Inwagen, Peter
Material Beings.VAN INWAGEN, Peter
Simples.Markosian, Ned

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Citations of this work BETA
Parthood.Sider, Theodore
Illusions of Gunk.Williams, J. Robert G.
A Tale of Two Simples.Spencer, Joshua

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