Fuzzy mereology

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Abstract
This paper began life as a short section of a more general paper about non-classical mereologies. In that paper I had a mereological theory that I wanted to show could be applied to all sorts of different metaphysical positions — notably, to those positions that believe in mereological vagueness in re — in “vague individuals”. To do that I felt I first had to dispatch the leading rival theory of vague individuals, which is due to Peter van Inwa-gen, and holds that the part-whole relation admits of degrees. It seemed to me that this theory had a serious technical problem, or at best a serious gap. I sat down to write a paragraph or two highlighting the gap, preferably showing that it couldn’t be filled. This paper is the result
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Archival date: 2018-08-07
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References found in this work BETA
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
Material Beings.van Inwagen, Peter
Material Beings.van Inwagen, Peter

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2011-10-08

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