How Gödelian Ontological Arguments Fail

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Abstract
Ontological arguments like those of Gödel (1995) and Pruss (2009; 2012) rely on premises that initially seem plausible, but on closer scrutiny are not. The premises have modal import that is required for the arguments but is not immediately grasped on inspection, and which ultimately undermines the simpler logical intuitions that make the premises seem plausible. Furthermore, the notion of necessity that they involve goes unspecified, and yet must go beyond standard varieties of logical necessity. This leaves us little reason to believe the premises, while their implausible existential import gives us good reason not to.
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Archival date: 2018-02-19
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2018-02-19

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