How to Overcome Antirealists’ Objections to Scientific Realism

Axiomathes 30 (1):1-12 (2020)
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Abstract
Van Fraassen contends that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve a successful theory, T. I object that this contention places upon him the burden of showing that scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments, such as the pessimistic induction, do not rationally compel us to disbelieve T. Van Fraassen uses the English view of rationality to rationally disbelieve T. I argue that realists can use it to rationally believe T, despite scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments against T.
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2019, 2020
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First archival date: 2019-04-18
Latest version: 2 (2019-05-31)
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2019-04-18

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