New Objections to the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives

Filosofia Unisinos 20 (2) (2019)
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Abstract
The problem of unconceived alternatives can be undermined, regardless of whether the possibility space of alternatives is bounded or unbounded. If it is bounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet eliminated enough false alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already eliminated enough false alternatives. If it is unbounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet moved from the possibility space of false alternatives to the possibility space of true alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already moved from the former to the latter space.
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Archival date: 2018-12-01
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