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Ought Without Ability
In Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 165-178 (2015)
Abstract
In this chapter l want to question the idea according to which the relevant 'ought' for morality is that which implies 'can'. I believe there is an 'ought', relevant for morality, which does not imply 'can', and I want to defend its possibility.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2024-07-05
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54 (#100,142)
6 months
54 (#89,523)
2024-07-05
Downloads
54 (#100,142)
6 months
54 (#89,523)
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