Conditions of Knowledge

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Abstract
In this paper I suggest an account of knowledge by adding a fourth condition to the traditional analysis in terms of justified true belief. I am going to make a first proposal ruling out the Gettier-counterexamples.1 This proposal will then be corrected in the light of other counterexamples. The final analysis will be a combination of a justified-true-belief-account and a causal account of knowledge. Some philosophers have disputed that Gettier‟s examples must be accepted as refutations of the justified true belief analysis of knowledge.2 Their rejection rests on declining a principle underlying Gettier‟s reasoning, namely – as Thalberg calls it – the principle of deducibility of justification (PDJ). PDJ reads as following: For any proposition p, if a person S is justified in believing p, and p entails q, and S deduces q from p and accepts q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing q. This principle allows, for example, the move in Gettier‟s first example from the proposition a) “Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket” to proposition b) “The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket”. 1
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Archival date: 2018-07-13
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