Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (2023)
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Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic luck seems to undermine both knowledge-how and intentional action and we report experimental results that corroborate these judgments. These findings have implications for the role of knowledge in a theory of intentional action and for debates about the nature of knowledge-how and the significance of knowledge representation in folk psychology.

Author Profiles

Carlotta Pavese
Cornell University
Paul Henne
Lake Forest College
Bob Beddor
National University of Singapore


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