Know-How and Gradability

Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383 (2017)
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Abstract
Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees. On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against intellectualism about know-how—the view that know-how is a species of propositional knowledge. This essay defends intellectualism from the argument of gradability. It is argued that the gradability of ascriptions of know-how should be discounted as a rather superficial linguistic phenomenon, one that can be explained in a way compatible with the absoluteness of the state reported.
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Archival date: 2018-03-21
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References found in this work BETA
.Williamson, Timothy
Knowing Full Well.Sosa, Ernest
Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.Carter, J. Adam & Pritchard, Duncan
Know How.Stanley, Jason

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Citations of this work BETA
Knowing How.Cath, Yuri

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2017-08-17

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