The Logical Significance of Assertion: Frege on the Essence of Logic

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (8) (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Assertion plays a crucial dual role in Frege's conception of logic, a formal and a transcendental one. A recurrent complaint is that Frege's inclusion of the judgement-stroke in the Begriffsschrift is either in tension with his anti-psychologism or wholly superfluous. Assertion, the objection goes, is at best of merely psychological significance. In this paper, I defend Frege against the objection by giving reasons for recognising the central logical significance of assertion in both its formal and its transcendental role.

Author's Profile

Walter Pedriali
University of St. Andrews

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-16

Downloads
481 (#47,614)

6 months
115 (#44,336)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?