Normal Knowledge: Toward an Explanation-Based Theory of Knowledge

Journal of Philosophy 115 (3):141-157 (2018)
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In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not be indexed to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief. This shift is problematic for several prominent approaches to the theory of knowledge, including virtue reliabilism and proper functionalism (as normally conceived). The view that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief is better able to accommodate the shift in question.
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Archival date: 2017-09-19
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