Testimonial Knowledge-How

Erkenntnis:1-18 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
There is an emerging skepticism about the existence of testimonial knowledge-how (Hawley (2010)1, Poston (2016), Carter and Pritchard (2015a)). This is unsurprising since a number of influential approaches to knowledge-how struggle to accommodate testimonial knowledge how. Nonetheless, this scepticism is misguided. This paper establishes that there are cases of easy testimonial knowledge-how. It is structured as follows: First, a case is presented in which an agent acquires knowledge-how simply by accepting a speaker’s testimony. Second, it is argued that this knowledge-how is genuinely testimonial. Next, Poston’s (2016) arguments against easy testimonial knowledge-how are considered and rejected. The implications of the argument differ for intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how. The intellectualist must reject widespread assumptions about the communicative preconditions for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge. The Anti-intellectualist must find a way of accommodating the dependence of knowledge-how on speaker reliability. It is not clear how this can be done.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PEETK
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-02-11
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-02-11

Total downloads
58 ( #24,189 of 34,532 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #14,095 of 34,532 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.