God, Logic, and Quantum Information

Information Theory and Research eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 1 (20):1-10 (2020)
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Abstract

Quantum information is discussed as the universal substance of the world. It is interpreted as that generalization of classical information, which includes both finite and transfinite ordinal numbers. On the other hand, any wave function and thus any state of any quantum system is just one value of quantum information. Information and its generalization as quantum information are considered as quantities of elementary choices. Their units are correspondingly a bit and a qubit. The course of time is what generates choices by itself, thus quantum information and any item in the world in final analysis. The course of time generates necessarily choices so: The future is absolutely unorderable in principle while the past is always well-ordered and thus unchangeable. The present as the mediation between them needs the well-ordered theorem equivalent to the axiom of choice. The latter guarantees the choice even among the elements of an infinite set, which is the case of quantum information. The concrete and abstract objects share information as their common base, which is quantum as to the formers and classical as to the latters. The general quantities of matter in physics, mass and energy can be considered as particular cases of quantum information. The link between choice and abstraction in set theory allows of “Hume’s principle” to be interpreted in terms of quantum mechanics as equivalence of “many” and “much” underlying quantum information. Quantum information as the universal substance of the world calls for the unity of physics and mathematics rather than that of the concrete and abstract objects and thus for a form of quantum neo-Pythagoreanism in final analysis.

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Vasil Penchev
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

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