# Indeterminism in Quantum Mechanics: Beyond and/or Within

*Development of Innovation eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN)*8 (68):1-5 (2020)

**Abstract**

The problem of indeterminism in quantum mechanics usually being considered as a generalization determinism of classical mechanics and physics for the case of discrete (quantum) changes is interpreted as an only mathematical problem referring to the relation of a set of independent choices to a well-ordered series therefore regulated by the equivalence of the axiom of choice and the well-ordering “theorem”. The former corresponds to quantum indeterminism, and the latter, to classical determinism. No other premises (besides the above only mathematical equivalence) are necessary to explain how the probabilistic causation of quantum mechanics refers to the unambiguous determinism of classical physics. The same equivalence underlies the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. It merged the well-ordered components of the vectors of Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics and the non-ordered members of the wave functions of Schrödinger’s undulatory mechanics. The mathematical condition of that merging is just the equivalence of the axiom of choice and the well-ordering theorem implying in turn Max Born’s probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Particularly, energy conservation is justified differently than classical physics. It is due to the equivalence at issue rather than to the principle of least action. One may involve two forms of energy conservation corresponding whether to the smooth changes of classical physics or to the discrete changes of quantum mechanics. Further both kinds of changes can be equated to each other under the unified energy conservation as well as the conditions for the violation of energy conservation to be investigated therefore directing to a certain generalization of energy conservation.

**Categories**

(categorize this paper)

**PhilPapers/Archive ID**

PENIIQ

**Upload history**

Archival date: 2020-09-21

View other versions

View other versions

**Added to PP index**

2020-09-21

**Total views**

59 ( #55,692 of 65,584 )

**Recent downloads (6 months)**

16 ( #42,723 of 65,584 )

How can I increase my downloads?

**Downloads since first upload**

*This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.*