Attributing error without taking a stand

Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1453-1471 (2019)
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Abstract
Moral error theory is the doctrine that our first-order moral commitments are pervaded by systematic error. It has been objected that this makes the error theory itself a position in first-order moral theory that should be judged by the standards of competing first-order moral theories :87–139, 1996) and Kramer. Kramer: “the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. It is not something that can adequately be contested or confirmed through non-ethical reasoning” [2009, 1]). This paper shows that error theorists can resist this charge if they adopt a particular understanding of the presuppositions of moral discourse.
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Archival date: 2019-06-07
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2019-02-07

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