A Note on Johnson’s ‘A Refutation of Skeptical Theism’
Sophia 54 (1):35-43 (2015)
Abstract
In a recent article, David Kyle Johnson has claimed to have provided a ‘refutation’ of skeptical theism. Johnson’s refutation raises several interesting issues. But in this note, I focus on only one—an implicit principle Johnson uses in his refutation to update probabilities after receiving new evidence. I argue that this principle is false. Consequently, Johnson’s refutation, as it currently stands, is undermined
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PERANO-11
Upload history
Added to PP index
2014-09-24
Total views
311 ( #18,313 of 58,395 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #39,747 of 58,395 )
2014-09-24
Total views
311 ( #18,313 of 58,395 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #39,747 of 58,395 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.