Empirical ignorance as defeating moral intuitions? A puzzle for rule consequentialists

Analysis 79 (1):62-72 (2019)
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Abstract
This paper develops an argument that, if rule consequentialism is true, it’s not possible to defend it as the outcome of reflective equilibrium. Ordinary agents like you and me are ignorant of too many empirical facts. Our ignorance is a defeater for our moral intuitions. Even worse, there aren’t enough undefeated intuitions left to defend rule consequentialism. The problem I’ll describe won’t be specific to rule consequentialists, but it will be especially sharp for them.
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Archival date: 2019-06-07
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