Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth

Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529 (2019)
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Abstract
Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
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Archival date: 2019-02-21
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2019-02-20

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