In defense of non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony

Synthese 191 (14):3227-3237 (2014)
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Abstract

Almost everyone agrees that many testimonial beliefs constitute knowledge. According to non-reductionists, some testimonial beliefs possess positive epistemic status independent of that conferred by perception, memory, and induction. Recently, Jennifer Lackey has provided a counterexample to a popular version of this view. Here I argue that her counterexample fails

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Timothy Perrine
Rutgers - New Brunswick

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