Abstract

Epistemological contrastivism can model how infallible knowledge functions by employing the explanatory resource of structural differences between contrastive propositions, e.g., “P rather than Q”, and orthodox propositions, e.g., “P”. In doing so we notice that how this difference factors into our conception of infallible knowledge depends on two aspects: one, whether belief acts as a necessary condition for knowledge, and two, whether epistemic justification is construed as consciously internalist or non-consciously externalist. We further leverage the notion of phenomenal resolution, conceived as an outcome of one’s discriminative capacities in accessing their evidence, to clarify in what sense it becomes reasonable to say that the truth of P mutually excludes the truth of Q when the latter is contrasted to the former. Importantly then, there is a way of infallibly knowing that P that is indistinguishable from infallibly knowing that P rather than Q, and a way that is not.