Occipital and Left Temporal EEG Correlates of Phenomenal Consciousness

In Quoc Nam Tran & Hamid Arabnia (eds.), Emerging Trends in Computational Biology, Bioinformatics, and Systems Biology. Elsevier. pp. 335–354 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Phenomenal consciousness is “what is it like to be” a mental state: the stinging sharpness of a pin prick, the taste of chocolate or the vibrant red of a fire truck. “Access consciousness” refers to the possibility of a mental state to be available to the rest of the cognitive system (to be available, for example, to our production system language like when we try to describe the stinging sharpness of a pin prick, the taste of chocolate or the vibrant red of a fire truck). The access is representational in a way that phenomenology is not: the contrast is between feeling that stinging, savoring that chocolate or see that red and associated representations such that we may not access these representations (not being in possession of relevant concepts) but, if we experience, we have the experience that in fact we have (for example, see the red of the truck in contrast with see that this truck is red). Intuitively, the phenomenology is richer than access. In other words, our visual experience of things in the world is richer than our attention to them. However it remains open whether there are electrophysiological data of the richness of phenomenology in contrast with the access. We will present some electrophysiological data suggesting this richness of phenomenology.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PEROAL
Revision history
First archival date: 2017-11-29
Latest version: 4 (2018-06-14)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-03-25

Total downloads
86 ( #22,808 of 37,117 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #31,438 of 37,117 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.