Solving the Ideal Worlds Problem

Ethics 132 (1):89-126 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I introduce a new formulation of rule consequentialism, defended as an improvement on traditional formulations. My new formulation cleanly avoids what Parfit calls “ideal world” objections. I suggest that those objections arise because traditional formulations incorporate counterfactual comparisons about how things could go differently. My new formulation eliminates those counterfactual comparisons. Part of the interest of the new formulation is as a model of how to reformulate structurally similar views, including various kinds of contractualism.
No keywords specified (fix it)
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-10-09
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
25 ( #60,938 of 2,448,218 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #26,407 of 2,448,218 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.