Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?

In Bob Fischer Felipe Leon (ed.), Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Dordrecht: Synthese Library. pp. 281-308 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
My topic is moderate modal skepticism in the spirit of Peter van Inwagen. Here understood, this is a conservative version of modal empiricism that severely limits the extent to which an ordinary agent can reasonably believe “exotic” possibility claims. I offer a novel argument in support of this brand of skepticism: modal skepticism grounds an attractive (and novel) reply to Humean skepticism. Thus, I propose that modal skepticism be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility as a tool for dissolving philosophical paradox.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-04-08
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
386 ( #14,572 of 58,394 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
59 ( #12,552 of 58,394 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.