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Formalizing Self-Reference Paradox using Predicate Logic
Abstract
We begin with the hypothetical assumption that Tarski’s 1933 formula ∀ True(x) φ(x) has been defined such that ∀x Tarski:True(x) ↔ Boolean-True. On the basis of this logical premise we formalize the Truth Teller Paradox: "This sentence is true." showing syntactically how self-reference paradox is semantically ungrounded.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2017-02-13
Downloads
260 (#70,536)
6 months
79 (#76,308)
2017-02-13
Downloads
260 (#70,536)
6 months
79 (#76,308)
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