On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation

Synthese:1-32 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
In a series of papers over the past twenty years, and in a new book, Igor Douven has argued that Bayesians are too quick to reject versions of inference to the best explanation that cannot be accommodated within their framework. In this paper, I survey their worries and attempt to answer them using a series of pragmatic and purely epistemic arguments that I take to show that Bayes’ Rule really is the only rational way to respond to your evidence.
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PETOTP-10
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First archival date: 2020-10-16
Latest version: 2 (2021-06-20)
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2020-10-16

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