Pure Epistemic Proceduralism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I defend a pure proceduralist conception of legitimacy that applies to epistemic democracy. This conception, which I call pure epistemic proceduralism, does not depend on procedure-independent standards for good outcomes and relies on a proceduralist epistemology. It identifies a democratic decision as legitimate if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. My argument starts with a rejection of instrumentalism–the view that political equality is only instrumentally valuable. I reject instrumentalism on two grounds: (i) because it fails to respect reasonable value pluralism and to recognize the constitutive role of democratic procedures for legitimacy in pluralist societies, and (ii) because it neglects the constructive function of democratic decision-making. I then consider two alternatives to pure epistemic proceduralism: David Estlund's version of epistemic proceduralism and a Deweyan account of epistemic democracy. I argue that only pure epistemic proceduralism can make good on both shortcomings of instrumentalism, whereas each of the other two approaches only makes good on one and neglects the other.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PETPEP-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
603 ( #2,939 of 35,924 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
42 ( #7,984 of 35,924 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.