Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony: Burge on the A Priori Basis of Testimonial Entitlement

In Andreas Stokke & Eliot Michaelson (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
According to the Acceptance Principle, a person is entitled to accept a proposition that is presented as true (asserted) and that is intelligible to him or her, unless there are stronger reasons not to. Burge assumes this Principle and then argues that it has an apriori justification, basis or rationale. This paper expounds Burge's teleological reliability framework and the details of his a priori justification for the Principle. It then raises three significant doubts.
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