The Ontology of Compositeness Within Quantum Field Theory

Abstract

In this work, we attempt to define a notion of compositeness compatible with Quantum Field Theory. Considering the analytic properties of the S-matrix, we conclude that there is no satisfactory definition of compositeness compatible with Quantum Field Theory. Without this notion, one must claim that all bound states are equally fundamental, that is, one cannot rigorously claim that everyday objects are made of atoms or that atoms are made of protons and neutrons. I then show how an approximate notion of compositeness may be recovered in the regime where the mass of a bound state is close to a multi-particle threshold. Finally, we see that rejecting compositeness solves several of the "problems of everyday objects" encountered in an undergraduate metaphysics course.

Author's Profile

Toby Peterken
University of Edinburgh (PhD)

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2024-09-03

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