Eavesdropping: What is it good for?

Semantics and Pragmatics (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Eavesdropping judgments (judgments about truth, retraction, and consistency across contexts) about epistemic modals have been used in recent years to argue for a radical thesis: that truth is assessment-relative. We argue that judgments for 'I think that p' pattern in strikingly similar ways to judgments for 'Might p' and 'Probably p'. We argue for this by replicating three major experiments involving the latter and adding a condition with the form 'I think that p', showing that subjects respond in the same way to 'thinks' as to modals. This poses a serious challenge to relativist treatments of the modal judgments, since a relativist treatment of the corresponding 'thinks' judgments is totally implausible, so if a unified account of the phenomena is to be found, it cannot be a relativist one. We briefly sketch how a unified account might look.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PHIEWI
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-04-02
Latest version: 2 (2020-12-16)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-04-02

Total views
345 ( #19,416 of 2,454,450 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #38,661 of 2,454,450 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.