Naturalism

In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell. pp. 421-431 (1991)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Survey article on Naturalism dealing with Hume's NOFI (including Prior's objections), Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy and the Barren Tautology Argument. Naturalism, as I understand it, is a form of moral realism which rejects fundamental moral facts or properties. Thus it is opposed to both non-cognitivism, and and the error theory but also to non-naturalism. General conclusion: as of 1991: naturalism as a program has not been refuted though none of the extant versions look particularly promising.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PIGN
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2014-01-20

Total views
959 ( #4,678 of 2,440,222 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
135 ( #4,205 of 2,440,222 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.