Abstract

Howard Robinson has criticized the contemporary revival of hylomorphism in analytic philosophy for being inconsistent with the causal closure of the physical (CCP) and, by consequence, modern science. This thesis critically evaluates Robinson's criticism. We firstly analyze Robinson’s argument and reinforce it with Jaegwon Kim's causal overdetermination argument. We then turn to CCP itself, settling its exact meaning and highlighting its problems. We argue that CCP’s deferral of the meaning of “physical” to physics renders it false - if applied to present physics – or undetermined – if it refers to future physics. On top of that, a careful look at present physics shows that CCP is not actually given by physics, as its proponents often claim, but rather imposed on it. Having considered the insufficiencies of CCP, we turn to the philosophical framework of hylomorphism, arguing that contemporary structural accounts of hylomorphism are bound fall prey to Robinson’s and Kim’s arguments. As such, one should embrace a more classically-inspired version of transformational hylomorphism according to which the form of substance dynamically re-identifies the material parts of an entity towards the same end as a singular causal system. This account of form provides a cohesive distinction between substances on the one hand and mere heaps or aggregates of matter on the other. This will prove to be particularly advantageous when considering various examples from contemporary biology that defy CCP’s microreductionism in showing the importance and causal relevance of biological higher-level phenomena in shaping its lower-level physical and chemical surrogates. We conclude that CCP’s picture of nature, with its monistic view of causation, is not in line with our best science. Contemporary science, from physics to biology, provides us a picture of nature where there is a constant and dynamic interplay of higher and lower-level phenomena, with both shaping each other in novel and unpredictable ways. Aristotelian hylomorphism, with its pluralistic approach to causation, provides a much stronger metaphysical framework to ground such picture. It grounds both strong emergence and downwards causation in substantial forms and, as such, gives us the tools to understand the processual characters of substances whilst upholding their unity.