Abstract

This essay discusses the Vietnam War from the perspective of the strategist, and with focus on men-power,which is part of the concept of `order of the battle’. The interest is progressing toward determining best methodsfor the calculation of estimates of this type to decrease mistake in wars that involve various nations. Uponstudying the debate involving the estimates for the Vietnam War, period ranging from 1965 to 1968, theconclusion is that there were gross mistakes from the part of the military, and methods of producing the order ofthe battle have to be much better examined. Systems of decision, and management deserve revision, so that whathas happened during the Vietnam War does not repeat: important is saving human lives, not the prestige ofindividual institutions or even the amount of negative criticism that is made publicly available about them.National forces must mean also Academia, and there is a chance that Academia can improve those systems bymuch if governmental authorities acknowledge its existence in all sectors of the national life. The best strategyis still including the dissident group or person, not facing them as an enemy, when it comes to those who areregarded by the general public as part of the national forces.