Percepción Moral y Conocimiento Práctico en el Estoicismo

Journal of Ancient Philosophy 17 (1):121-138 (2023)
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Abstract

In a paper published in 1998, Ricardo Salles argues that the Stoic theory of action cannot account for practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what action is appropriate to be carried out in certain circumstances. The aim of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem. For this aim, I argue that the Stoics developed a perceptual theory of moral knowledge. According to this theory, the moral properties instantiated in objects, people, and actions are known through perception. After explaining this theory, I argue that it allows us to show that the Stoics deemed perception as a source of practical knowledge.

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Christian Pineda
National Autonomous University of Mexico

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